Stakeholders? evolutionary relationship analysis of China?s national park ecotourism development

To mitigate the conflict of economic development and ecological protection, China government initiates its national park plan in recent years. In this stage, addressing the benefit contradictories among stakeholders is of importance. Around this issue, this paper focuses on the one of most keen-edged topics in China, which is how to deal well with the coordination issue among local government, tourism development enterprise and local residents. To disentangle the complexly dynamic relationships among them, a set of mathematical models are built and derived, based on evolutionary game theory. The corresponding results indicate that the intensity of regulation by local governments, the degree of compensation to ecotourism development projects by tourism development enterprises, and the participation degree of local residents to the projects are closely related to ultimate game stabilization; some propositions are gained accordingly, which suggest the bounded conditions to achieve the optimal stabilization. To validate and broaden the results, the relevant numerical simulation and discussion are provided.

Automated summary

This paper focuses on the coordination issue among local government, tourism development enterprise, and local residents in China, with the aim of addressing the conflict between economic development and ecological protection. Using mathematical models based on evolutionary game theory, the study establishes the complex relationships among stakeholders and proposes conditions for achieving optimal stabilization.