4.7 Article

A class of hybrid LQG mean field games with state-invariant switching and stopping strategies

Journal

AUTOMATICA
Volume 141, Issue -, Pages -

Publisher

PERGAMON-ELSEVIER SCIENCE LTD
DOI: 10.1016/j.automatica.2022.110244

Keywords

Mean field games; Hybrid optimal control; Switching and stopping times

Funding

  1. Fonds de Recherche du Quebec-Nature et Technologies, Canada [258061]
  2. Natural Sciences and Engineering Research Council, Canada [2019-05336]
  3. Air Force Office of Scientific Research, USA [FA9550-19-1-0138]

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A novel framework that combines Mean Field Game (MFG) theory and Hybrid Optimal Control (HOC) theory is proposed to obtain a unique epsilon-Nash equilibrium for a non-cooperative game with switching and stopping times. The framework considers a major agent and a large number of minor agents, where each agent has stochastic linear dynamics with quadratic costs. The optimal switching and stopping times are shown to be state-invariant and only depend on the dynamical parameters of each agent. Optimal strategies for switchings and stopping times are established using Hybrid LQG MFG theory.
A novel framework is presented that combines Mean Field Game (MFG) theory and Hybrid Optimal Control (HOC) theory to obtain a unique epsilon-Nash equilibrium for a non-cooperative game with switching and stopping times. We consider the case where there exists one major agent with a significant influence on the system together with a large number of minor agents constituting two subpopulations, each agent with individually asymptotically negligible effect on the whole system. Each agent has stochastic linear dynamics with quadratic costs, and the agents are coupled in their dynamics and costs by the average state of minor agents (i.e. the empirical mean field). It is shown that for a class of Hybrid LQG MFGs, the optimal switching and stopping times are state-invariant and only depend on the dynamical parameters of each agent. Accordingly, a hybrid systems formulation of the game is presented via the indexing by discrete events: (i) the switching of the major agent between alternative dynamics or (ii) the termination of the agents' trajectories in one or both of the subpopulations of minor agents. Optimal switchings and stopping time strategies together with best response control actions for, respectively, the major agent and all minor agents are established with respect to their individual cost criteria by an application of Hybrid LQG MFG theory. (c) 2022 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

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