Journal
JOURNAL OF CLEANER PRODUCTION
Volume 120, Issue -, Pages 72-84Publisher
ELSEVIER SCI LTD
DOI: 10.1016/j.jclepro.2015.11.049
Keywords
Low carbon SCM; Contracting emission reduction; Cost-sharing contract; Wholesale price premium contract; Low carbon preference
Categories
Funding
- NSFC [71202086, 71072155, 71528002]
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Under the low-carbon environment, we focus on a dyadic supply chain with a manufacturer and a retailer to develop a game model for studying the issues of carbon emission reduction within the retailer dominant and the power balanced cases, respectively. The consumers are assumed to be of environmental consciousness and accordingly will note the carbon footprint of product when shopping. We find that with the cost-sharing and the wholesale price premium contracts, the retailer can achieve the goal of jointly reducing carbon emissions with the manufacturer, which can promote the manufacturer to increase the carbon emission reduction rate and raise the profit of supply chain. In both the retailer dominant case and the power balance case, the cost-sharing contract can result in Pareto improvement in the performance of both the manufacturer and the retailer. However, the wholesale price premium contract can increase the profit of the supply chain only when the level of low carbon preference is high in the retailer dominant case, and it can also represent a Pareto improvement for the supply chain even if when the level of low carbon preference is low in the power balanced case. (C) 2015 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
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