Journal
RELIGIOUS STUDIES
Volume 59, Issue -, Pages S109-S117Publisher
CAMBRIDGE UNIV PRESS
DOI: 10.1017/S0034412522000038
Keywords
problem of evil; evidence; metaphysical necessity; traditional God
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The article argues that if S5 is the logic of metaphysical necessity, then no possible state of affairs can provide any significant evidence for or against the existence of God. Assuming S4 or K-sigma rho as the logic of metaphysical necessity also leads to untenable epistemological and metaphysical consequences for philosophical theology.
The article aims to show that, if S5 is the logic of metaphysical necessity, then no state of affairs in any possible world constitutes any non-trivial evidence for or against the existence of the traditional God. There might well be states of affairs in some worlds describing extraordinary goods and extraordinary evils, but it is false that these states of affairs constitute any (non-trivial) evidence for or against the existence of God. The epistemological and metaphysical consequences for philosophical theology of assuming that S4 or K-sigma rho is the logic of metaphysical necessity are equally untenable. S4 guarantees that God does not exist if there is the slightest evidence against the existence of God. And K-sigma rho guarantees that God might survive the loss or acquisition of any essential property at all.
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