4.6 Article

Estimating Social Preferences and Gift Exchange at Work

Journal

AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
Volume 112, Issue 3, Pages 1038-1074

Publisher

AMER ECONOMIC ASSOC
DOI: 10.1257/aer.20190920

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We conduct three field experiments to examine how workers' social preferences toward their employer affect their work effort. Our findings suggest that workers exert effort even without private incentives, but their effort is not significantly influenced by the return to the employer. Additionally, unexpected gifts have no impact on productivity but do lead to extra work. This disparity can be partially explained by the fact that extra work is more sensitive to incentives compared to productivity.
We design three field experiments to estimate how workers' social preferences toward their employer motivates their work effort. We vary the pay rates offered to workers, the return to the employer, and employer generosity demonstrated via unexpected gifts. Workers exert effort even without private incentives, but their effort is insensitive to the return to the employer. This is consistent with warm glow but not pure altruism. The gifts have no effect on productivity, but engender extra work. This difference is explained partly by the finding that extra work is much more responsive to incentives than is productivity. (JEL C93, J24, J28, J33, M52)

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