A framework to implement human reliability analysis during early design stages of advanced reactors

Nuclear power plants require human actions throughout their lifecycle from design, construction, operation, and decommissioning. However, for advanced reactors (e.g., Generation IV), the reliance on human intervention in safety-related actions is expected to be reduced or completely replaced by automated actions. The Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) Standard for Advanced Non-LWR Nuclear Power Plants requires that the impacts of all operator actions are captured and incorporated in the risk of the modeled plant. Moreover, the Modernization of Technical Requirements for Licensing Advanced Reactors requires human reliability analysis (HRA) to be included throughout all design and PRA development stages. However, due to the lack of details during the early design stages, HRA is often postponed until the design is mature enough. Conducting HRA in later design stages, though it may be adequate in capturing pre-, at-, and post-initiators comes short of informing the design itself in the iterative design lifecycle. Hence, this paper presents a framework to include HRA during the design's early stages, pre-conceptual or conceptual. The proposed framework provides a process for the removal of operator actions that do not contribute to the risk and the identification of all key operator actions that are critical to the safety of the design. The results of this framework are then used to inform the design of those safety-related operator actions to update the design further. Then, using information from the updated design, this framework can be reapplied to investigate the impact of the design update on human reliability. The PRA model of the X-energy's pre-conceptual Xe-100 high-temperature gas-cooled pebble-bed reactor (HTGR-PB) design is used to demonstrate the approach. In the pre-conceptual Xe-100 PRA model, also called Phase 0 PRA model, human actions were considered an integral part of analyzing the plant response to different initiating events. Hence, in this paper, all possible human actions in the Xe-100 PRA model are identified, analyzed, and removed to emulate a design relying only on the available automated control systems. The preliminary results of this assessment show how safe the Xe-100 design is even without crediting any human actions. The results also list necessary sequences in which operator actions are critical to the risk profile of the design.

Automated summary

This paper presents a framework to include human reliability analysis (HRA) during the early stages of nuclear power plant design, aiming to guide the design and evaluate the reliance on human actions. The framework is demonstrated using X-energy's pre-conceptual Xe-100 high-temperature gas-cooled pebble-bed reactor (HTGR-PB) design, showing the safety and reliability of the design even without considering human actions.