Effects of governmental policies on energy-efficiency improvement of hydrogen fuel cell cars: A game-theoretic approach

In this research, an aspect of sustainable development is investigated by considering the energy efficiency improvement of the hydrogen fuel cell cars on a supply chain including government, supplier, manufacturer, agency, and customers. The manufacturer produces the hydrogen fuel cell cars and sells them to customers via his agency. The monopolistic supplier procures the hydrogen fuel for customers. The manufacturer aims to improve the energy efficiency rate of his products by reducing their fuel consumption. In this setting, the government stimulates the manufacturer to invest in this scheme by paying a subsidy to him as well as by reducing his tax rate. Based on these governmental policies, the problem is investigated under different scenarios. Then, the game-theoretic frameworks are applied to make the equilibrium decisions. Finally, the given decisions are analyzed to reveal some managerial insights. It is found that the demand of the hydrogen fuel cell cars and the members' profits increase as the efficiency improvement rate increases. Moreover, by increasing the subsidy rate paid to the manufacturer and by decreasing the tax rate imposed on him, the government can increase the demand of the hydrogen cars and provide more incentive for the members to incorporate into the business. (c) 2022 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Automated summary

This research investigates the impact of energy efficiency improvement in hydrogen fuel cell cars on sustainable development, considering a supply chain involving government, supplier, manufacturer, agency, and customers. The study finds that increasing the efficiency improvement rate can increase the demand for hydrogen cars and members' profits, under government incentives.