Journal
BEHAVIORAL ECOLOGY AND SOCIOBIOLOGY
Volume 76, Issue 4, Pages -Publisher
SPRINGER
DOI: 10.1007/s00265-022-03159-9
Keywords
Game theory; Hermaphrodite; Reproductive success; Sex allocation; Subordinate
Categories
Funding
- JSPS [19K06838]
- Grants-in-Aid for Scientific Research [19K06838] Funding Source: KAKEN
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This study investigated the reasons why subordinate individuals in most sex-changing fishes choose to be female or are forced to give up their male function, finding that subordinates are only evicted by dominant males when there is a significant difference in reproductive resources.
In most sex-changing fishes in coral reefs, a dominant male and multiple females form a mating group (harem). In a few species, the subordinates are simultaneous hermaphrodites that may act as sneakers. In this paper, we ask whether the subordinates in most sex changers choose to be female or whether they are forced to give up their male function to avoid eviction by the harem holder. We consider a game model in which (1) the dominant male evicts some hermaphroditic subordinates if the risk of sperm competition in regard to fertilizing eggs is high, and (2) each subordinate individual chooses its own sex allocation considering the risk of being evicted. In the evolutionarily stable state, the dominant male evicts subordinates only when the subordinates vary greatly in their reproductive resources. All the subordinate individuals are female if the summed male function of the subordinates is smaller than that of the dominant male. Otherwise, all the subordinates are hermaphrodites, and the large individuals have the same male investment but a greatly different female investment, while small individuals have a reduced male investment to avoid eviction risk. We conclude that situations in which the sex allocation of subordinates is affected by the possibility of eviction by the harem holder are rather limited Significance statement We studied the role of eviction in social evolution. In most sex-changing fishes in coral reefs, a dominant male and multiple females form a mating group. In a few species, subordinates are simultaneous hermaphrodites. We asked whether the subordinates are forced to give up their male function to avoid eviction by the harem holder. We examined a game model in which the dominant male evicts hermaphroditic subordinates with a high risk of sperm competition, and each subordinate chooses its own sex allocation considering the eviction risk. We derived mathematical conditions for when subordinates are females or hermaphrodites in the ESS. The model demonstrated that the control by the dominant over subordinate reproductive decisions is rather limited.
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