INTERSUBJECTIVITY AND ANALYTIC FIELD THEORY

Intersubjectivity is the central concept of the relational paradigm, the most widely employed in contemporary psychoanalysis. Yet we do not have a clear definition of it. Usually it is synonymous with the interpersonal and thus indicates the interaction that takes place between two already constituted subjects. In this sense it has little to do with the radical social theory of subjectivation suggested by the term, at least originally, in Husserl's philosophy. In the original meaning of intersubjectivity, as handed down by Husserl and later developed by Merleau-Ponty, the binary opposition between subjectivity and intersubjectivity is dissolved and transformed into a dialectic relationship. To formulate a clear and distinct, but above all specific, definition of intersubjectivity, we need to reclaim this intuition and translate it into coherent principles of technique. It is also essential to verify whether the models of psychoanalysis proffered as intersubjective actually satisfy this parameter. On the basis of these two simple principles, the variants of psychoanalysis that are labeled intersubjective can be placed along a continuum. Examples are given of weak and strong intersubjectivity. Paradigmatic of the latter pole is the post-Bionian theory of the analytic field.

Automated summary

Intersubjectivity is a central concept in contemporary psychoanalysis, referring to the interaction between two constituted subjects. Originating from Husserl and developed by Merleau-Ponty, intersubjectivity dissolves the binary opposition between subjectivity and intersubjectivity, transforming it into a dialectic relationship. Examples of weak and strong intersubjectivity are provided, with the latter exemplified by the post-Bionian theory of the analytic field.