Journal
JOURNAL OF REFUGEE STUDIES
Volume 35, Issue 4, Pages 1472-1491Publisher
OXFORD UNIV PRESS
DOI: 10.1093/jrs/feac002
Keywords
INGOs; humanitarian responses; political economy; refugees; international aid
Categories
Funding
- National Science Foundation [2019288718]
- Harvard Weather head Center for International Affairs
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The political economy of international aid during humanitarian crises has been explored through the lens of vertical principal-agent problems. This perspective highlights the inefficiencies caused by informational asymmetries, divergent interests, and competition between international actors. However, the horizontal coordination between these actors has been largely overlooked. This study argues that the incentives of coordinating actors, donor monitoring, and the risk of elimination contribute to the coordination behavior of international organizations and non-governmental organizations. The author examines the relationships between stakeholders and the use of coordination technologies during the Syrian refugee response in Jordan.
Political economy literature on the incentives of international actors during humanitarian crises has cast international aid coordination inefficiencies during humanitarian crises as a product of vertical principal-agent problems with informational asymmetries, divergent interests, and inter-agent competition. However, horizontal coordination between international actors represents an important and understudied dimension of the political economy of international aid during refugee responses. Horizontal coordination structures, while offering a potential solution to the principal-agent problem of humanitarian responses, can either result in coordination in practice or coordination in performance. I argue that the incentives of coordinating actors, the level of donor monitoring, and the risk of elimination of some organizations or material opportunities as a result of effective coordination all factor into international organization and international non-governmental organization coordination behaviour. I examine the relationships between stakeholders during the Syrian refugee response in Jordan and the differential take-up of coordination technologies to test my theory with policy implications.
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