The many-worlds theory of consciousness

This paper sketches a new and somewhat heterodox metaphysical theory of consciousness: the many-worlds theory. It drops the assumption that all conscious subjects' experiences are features of one and the same world and instead associates different subjects with different first-personally centred worlds. We can think of these as distinct first-personal realizers of a shared third-personal world, where the latter is supervenient, in a sense to be explained. This is combined with a form of modal realism, according to which different subjects' first-personally centred worlds are all real, though only one of them is present for each subject. The theory offers a novel way of capturing the irreducibly subjective nature of conscious experience without lapsing into solipsism. The paper also looks at some scientific theories of consciousness, such as integrated information theory, through the proposed lens and reconsiders the hard problem of consciousness.

Automated summary

This paper presents a new and unconventional metaphysical theory of consciousness called the many-worlds theory. It suggests that conscious experiences are associated with different first-personally centred worlds, and combines this with modal realism to explain the subjective nature of consciousness without falling into solipsism. The paper also explores scientific theories of consciousness, such as integrated information theory, and reconsiders the hard problem of consciousness.