Journal
INFORMATION SYSTEMS RESEARCH
Volume 33, Issue 2, Pages 464-475Publisher
INFORMS
DOI: 10.1287/isre.2021.1077
Keywords
trading platforms; advertising-based model; commission-based model; second-price auctions; consumer profiling
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The research finds that platforms that charge sellers for discoveries have a perverse incentive to deviate from accurate buyer profiling, while platforms that charge sellers for transactions do not have this incentive. As a result, social welfare is lower under discovery-based pricing compared to transaction-based pricing.
Consumer profiling has become one of the most common practices on online trading platforms. Many platforms strive to obtain and implement technological innovations that allow them to understand and identify consumers' needs, and, thereafter, monetize this capability by charging sellers to present and/or sell their products or services based on consumers' interests. However, an interesting and relevant question arises in this context: Does the platform have an incentive to profile its buyers as accurately as possible? This paper develops and analyzes a parsimonious game-theoretic model to answer this research question. We find that, surprisingly, platforms that charge sellers for discoveries have a perverse incentive to deviate from accurate buyer profiling. However, such a perverse incentive does not exist for platforms that charge sellers for transactions. As a result, with such a perverse incentive, social welfare under discovery-based pricing is lower than that under transaction-based pricing.
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