Journal
SUSTAINABLE PRODUCTION AND CONSUMPTION
Volume 28, Issue -, Pages 1687-1698Publisher
ELSEVIER
DOI: 10.1016/j.spc.2021.09.014
Keywords
Subsidy; Agricultural residues; Stakeholders; Evolutionary game; Simulation
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The study suggests that the government should consider both enterprises and individuals in agricultural residue recycling, and the amount of subsidy is a key factor in policy effectiveness. A scientific dynamic adjustment mechanism should be established to ensure the effective implementation of policies.
In recent years, the environmental problems caused by improper treatment of agricultural residues are becoming increasingly severe. Although the government has established various subsidy policies for agricultural residues recycling, the expected results have not been achieved. Existing literature focuses on the government perspective and lacks analysis of participant decision making. In this study, a tripartite evolutionary game model of government, enterprises, and individuals is established to analyze and participate in decision making from the stakeholder perspective. MATLAB is used for numerical simulation analysis. Results show that when the government subsidizes agricultural residues recycling only for enterprises or individuals cannot achieve the expected results. Rather, government subsidies should consider both enterprises and individuals. At the same time, the amount is one of the keys to the effectiveness of the subsidy. The government needs to establish a scientific dynamic adjustment mechanism to ensure the effective implementation of policies. (C) 2021 Institution of Chemical Engineers. Published by Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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