4.7 Article

Green Supply Chain Management with Nash Bargaining Loss-Averse Reference Dependence

Journal

MATHEMATICS
Volume 9, Issue 24, Pages -

Publisher

MDPI
DOI: 10.3390/math9243154

Keywords

green supply chain; loss aversion; nash bargaining solution; product green degree; green efficiency coefficient

Categories

Funding

  1. National Natural Science Foundation of China [71971218, U1904210]
  2. Doctoral fund of Henan Polytechnic University [760207/025]
  3. Special project for key R & D and promotion in Henan Province [212400410323]

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This paper investigates a two-echelon green supply chain with loss-averse members and analyzes the optimal strategies and profits in different scenarios. The impact of loss aversion and green efficiency coefficient of products on the supply chain is also studied, showing critical influences on retail and wholesale prices, as well as product green degree.
This paper investigates a two-echelon green supply chain (GSC) with a single loss-averse manufacturer and a single loss-averse retailer. Since the Nash bargaining solution exactly characterizes endogenous power and the contribution of the GSC members, it is introduced as the loss-averse reference point for the GSC members. Based on this, a decision model of the two-echelon GSC with loss aversion is formulated. The optimal strategies of price and product green degree are derived in four scenarios: (a) the centralized decision scenario with rational GSC members, namely the CD scenario; (b) the decentralized decision scenario with rational GSC members, namely the DD scenario; (c) the decentralized decision scenario with the GSC members loss-averse, where the manufacturer's share is below its own loss-averse reference point, namely the DD( increment (m) >= pi(m)) scenario; (d) the decentralized decision scenario with the GSC members loss-averse, where the retailer's share is below its own loss-averse reference point, namely the DD( increment (r) >= pi(r)) scenario. Then, a comparative analysis of the optimal strategies and profits in these four scenarios is conducted, and the impacts of loss aversion and green efficiency coefficient of products (GECP) on the GSC are also performed. The results show that (i) GECP has a critical influence on the retail price and the wholesale price; (ii) the GSC with loss aversion provide green products with the lowest green degree; (iii) the retail price, the wholesale price and product green degree are decreasing monotonically with the loss aversion level of the GSC member without incurring loss; (iv) furthermore, the effect of the loss aversion level of the GSC member with incurring loss on the optimal strategies is related to GECP and the gap between the GSC members' loss aversion levels.

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