Optimal Effort on Self-Insurance-Cum-Protection: A New Analysis Using Yaari's Dual Theory

People take different measures to control risks. The measures that can simultaneously reduce loss probability and loss size are called self-insurance-cum-protection. This paper studies self-insurance-cum-protection using Yaari's dual theory. We analyze the comparative statics of increased risk aversion. Two different sufficient conditions are found in the two-state model, from which an increase in the level of risk aversion will lead to an increase in the level of self-insurance-cum-protection. The first condition is a new result under Yaari's dual theory and its implication is that the more risk-averse individual is willing to exert greater effort on self-insurance-cum-protection if the probability of loss can be reduced to very small by a less risk-averse individual with optimal effort. The second condition depends on the forms of the self-insurance-cum protection cost and the loss. This condition is the same as that obtained under expected utility in existing literature. Our study therefore assures the robustness this result. We also study comparative statics in the continuous model and find out that the results are analogous to that in the two-state model. In addition, we consider how the availability of market insurance affects the self-insurance-cum-protection level. When the probability of loss is small, the self-insurance-cum-protection and market insurance are substitutes. This means when market insurance is available, people tend to exert less effort on self-insurance-cum-protection.

Automated summary

This paper examines self-insurance-cum-protection using Yaari's dual theory and identifies two sufficient conditions and the impact of increased risk aversion on the level of self-insurance-cum-protection. It also explores how the availability of market insurance affects the level of self-insurance-cum-protection.