Resilient Distributed Coordination Control of Multiarea Power Systems Under Hybrid Attacks

Resilient distributed coordination control is studied on multiarea power systems with low inertia under hybrid attacks, including denial-of-service (DoS) attack and deception attack. The communication among various areas under the DoS attack is deteriorated to switching residual topologies whose time characteristic is modeled by model-dependent average dwell time (MDADT). Deception attack with malicious strategy targeting at negative feedback control is modeled by a sign function. To obtain resilience performance of the power system under low inertia and hybrid attacks, resilient distributed scheme combining load-frequency control (LFC) with virtual inertia control (VIC) is proposed. Then, resilient frequency control problem of the studied power system is converted to H-infinity control of the switched nonlinear system. By employing the Lyapunov stability theory and switched system method, the resilient conditions are given by the lower bound of the average dwell time of each residual topology and the upper bound of deception attacks. Furthermore, a linear matrix inequality (LMI) technique is used to design the distributed resilient control gains of the LFC-VIC scheme. Finally, a simulation of four-area power systems is carried out to verify the validness of our theory.

Automated summary

Resilient distributed coordination control is studied on multiarea power systems with low inertia under hybrid attacks, including denial-of-service (DoS) attack and deception attack. The proposed resilient distributed scheme combines load-frequency control (LFC) with virtual inertia control (VIC), and uses a linear matrix inequality (LMI) technique to design the distributed resilient control gains. The validity of the theory is verified through simulation of a four-area power system.