4.7 Article

Carbon cap-and-trade schemes in closed-loop supply chains: Why firms do not comply?

Publisher

PERGAMON-ELSEVIER SCIENCE LTD
DOI: 10.1016/j.tre.2021.102486

Keywords

Closed-loop supply chain; Carbon cap-and-trade; Compliance and noncompliance; Network equilibrium; Variational inequality; Noncompliance penalty

Funding

  1. National Natural Science Foundation of China [71972172]
  2. Humanity and Social Science Planning Foundation of Ministry of Education of China [19YJA630101]
  3. Philosophy and Social Sciences Planning Foundation of Zhejiang Province [20NDJC114YB]
  4. Fundamental Research Funds for the Provincial Universities of Zhejiang [2019YW04]
  5. China Scholarship Council [201808330108]

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The study focuses on compliance and noncompliance behavior of supply chain players under a carbon cap-and-trade scheme, utilizing game theoretic models and network equilibrium models to examine influencing factors. Extensive numerical analysis reveals the impact of noncompliance penalties, remanufacturing ratios, and production emissions on equilibrium results.
In a cap-and-trade scheme, firms with low carbon emissions can trade their excess emission credits with other firms who generate more emissions than their allocated allowance. However, some firms do not fully comply with the imposed carbon policy and even exceed their overall emission capacity, including their dedicated credits as well as the credits purchased in the carbon market. The noncompliance behavior of these firms is often penalised by monetary fines. We are interested in a quantitative study to understand the characteristics of this noncompliance penalty. We present game theoretic models to investigate the network impact of compliance and noncompliance behavior of the players in a closed-loop supply chain operating under a carbon cap-and-trade scheme. The network equilibrium models are utilized to study the interactive behavior of the supply chain players. Extensive numerical analysis is completed to examine the effect of noncompliance penalties, remanufacturing ratios, and production emissions on the equilibrium results. The analysis arrives at importart managerial and regulatory insights.

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