Fare inspection patrols scheduling in transit systems using a Stackelberg game approach

This study analyzes the scheduling of unpredictable fare inspections in proof-of-payment transit systems, where the transit operator chooses a collection of patrol paths (one for each patrol) every day with some probability in order to avoid any regularity that could be exploited by opportunistic passengers. We use a Stackelberg game approach to represent the hierarchical decision-making process between the transit operator and opportunistic passengers, whose decision on whether to evade the fare depends on the inspection probabilities set by the transit operator. Unlike previous work, we use an exact formulation of the inspection probabilities that allows us to develop new heuristics for the fare inspection scheduling problem, and to assess their solution quality in terms of their optimality gap.

Automated summary

This study analyzes the scheduling of unpredictable fare inspections in proof-of-payment transit systems using a Stackelberg game approach. It introduces an exact formulation of inspection probabilities and develops new heuristics for the fare inspection scheduling problem.