The physics and metaphysics of Tychistic Bohmian Mechanics

The paper takes up Bell's (1987) Everett (?) theory and develops it further. The resulting theory is about the system of all particles in the universe, each located in ordinary, 3-dimensional space. This many-particle system as a whole performs random jumps through 3N-dimensional configuration space - hence Tychistic Bohmian Mechanics (TBM). The distribution of its spontaneous localisations in configuration space is given by the Born Rule probability measure for the universal wavefunction. Contra Bell, the theory is argued to satisfy the minimal desiderata for a Bohmian theory within the Primitive Ontology framework (for which we offer a metaphysically more perspicuous formulation than is customary). TBM's formalism is that of ordinary Bohmian Mechanics (BM), without the postulate of continuous particle trajectories and their deterministic dynamics. This rump formalism receives, however, a different interpretation. We defend TBM as an empirically adequate and coherent quantum theory. Objections voiced by Bell and Maudlin are rebutted. The for all practical purposes-classical, Everettian worlds (i.e. quasi-classical histories) exist sequentially in TBM (rather than simultaneously, as in the Everett interpretation). In a temporally coarse-grained sense, they quasi-persist. By contrast, the individual particles themselves cease to persist.

Automated summary

The paper discusses Bell's Everett theory and develops TBM theory further, which considers the system of all particles in the universe performing random jumps in configuration space. Unlike traditional Bohmian Mechanics, TBM theory does not assume continuous particle trajectories and deterministic dynamics but is defended as an empirically adequate and coherent quantum theory. Furthermore, it argues for the sequential existence of Everettian worlds in TBM, with quasi-classical histories persisting in a temporally coarse-grained sense while individual particles themselves cease to persist.