Game analysis of nuclear wastewater discharge under different attitudes: Seeking a potential equilibrium solution

Marine pollution is an increasingly dangerous problem, affecting people across the world. Japan's decision on 13 April 2021 to discharge nuclear wastewater into the sea has aroused the close attention of interest-related coun-tries. To resolve conflicts among various countries and achieve the harmonious development of the marine and economic environment, we employ the static game, the rank-dependent expected utility (RDEU) game, and the sequential game to comprehensively analyze the equilibrium strategies of discharge country and interest-related countries under different situations. Our analysis reveals that in the static game and sequential game where interest-related countries make decisions first, the discharge behavior of the discharge country should be re-stricted from the perspective of the internal and external benefits of the discharge country. In addition, when in-tegrating changes in emotion into the game, it can be found that the most expected emotional state to prevent the discharge country from discharging nuclear wastewater for interest-related countries is to remain pessimis-tic. Overall, this study provides important implications for inter-state relations and environmental protection. (c) 2021 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Automated summary

The study comprehensively analyzes the equilibrium strategies of the discharge country and interest-related countries under different situations using static game, RDEU game, and sequential game. It suggests that when interest-related countries make decisions first, the discharge behavior of the discharge country should be restricted from the perspective of internal and external benefits.