4.8 Article

Evolution of cooperation with asymmetric social interactions

Publisher

NATL ACAD SCIENCES
DOI: 10.1073/pnas.2113468118

Keywords

cooperation; evolutionary game theory; asymmetric relationships; directed graphs

Funding

  1. Simons Foundation
  2. David and Lucille Packard Foundation
  3. John Templeton Foundation

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This article discusses the emergence of cooperation in human societies and proposes the possibility of cooperation in directed social networks. The study found that even without the opportunity for reciprocation, cooperation can still be favored in networks with a certain proportion of unidirectional interactions.
How cooperation emerges in human societies is both an evolutionary enigma and a practical problem with tangible implications for societal health. Population structure has long been recognized as a catalyst for cooperation because local interactions facilitate reciprocity. Analysis of population structure typically assumes bidirectional social interactions. But human social interactions are often unidirectional-where one individual has the opportunity to contribute altruistically to another, but not conversely-as the result of organizational hierarchies, social stratification, popularity effects, and endogenous mechanisms of network growth. Here we expand the theory of cooperation in structured populations to account for both uni- and bidirectional social interactions. Even though unidirectional interactions remove the opportunity for reciprocity, we find that cooperation can nonetheless be favored in directed social networks and that cooperation is provably maximized for networks with an intermediate proportion of unidirectional interactions, as observed in many empirical settings. We also identify two simple structural motifs that allow efficient modification of interaction directions to promote cooperation by orders of magnitude. We discuss how our results relate to the concepts of generalized and indirect reciprocity.

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