Journal
PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE
Volume 89, Issue 3, Pages 542-564Publisher
CAMBRIDGE UNIV PRESS
DOI: 10.1017/psa.2021.40
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- DFF Sapere Aude grant [4180-00071]
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Theoretical virtues are important for the acceptance and belief of theories in both science and philosophy. Scientists and philosophers have similar views on the virtues, with all three groups having a preference order regarding theoretical virtues. Surprisingly, social scientists value simplicity as an epistemic virtue, while philosophers do not. Additionally, syntactic parsimony is preferred over ontological parsimony by all three groups.
Theoretical virtues play an important role in the acceptance and belief of theories in science and philosophy. Philosophers have well-developed views on which virtues ought and ought not to influence one's acceptance and belief. But what do scientists think? This paper presents the results of a quantitative study with scientists from the natural and social sciences and compares their views to those held by philosophers. Some of the more surprising results are: (i) all three groups have a preference order regarding theoretical virtues, making theory choice a much more determinate matter than what has sometimes been suggested; (ii) the preference orders are very similar for the three groups; (iii) simplicity is viewed as an epistemic virtue particularly by social scientists (but not by philosophers); and (iv) syntactic parsimony is preferred to ontological parsimony by all three groups.
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