4.3 Article

Buyback and price postponement in a decentralized supply chain with additive and price-dependent demand

Journal

NAVAL RESEARCH LOGISTICS
Volume 69, Issue 6, Pages 869-883

Publisher

WILEY
DOI: 10.1002/nav.22052

Keywords

additive demand; buyback; price postponement

Funding

  1. National Key R&D Program of China [2020AAA0103804]
  2. National Natural Science Foundation of China [72192823]
  3. National Nature Science Foundation of China [71901200]
  4. Hong Kong Research Grants Council (GRF Project) [LU 13501617]

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This study examines buyback contracts in a dyadic supply chain and focuses on optimal buyback contracts under linear additive demand. The results show that the supplier's preference for buyback contracts depends on the unit production cost and the dispersion of demand uncertainty, and the optimal buyback rate and profit allocation within the supply chain are also affected by demand uncertainty.
We examine buyback contracts in a dyadic supply chain where a retailer orders from a supplier before observing the random demand and sets a retail price after observing it (a.k.a. price postponement). We focus on the case with linear additive demand, which is well known to be less tractable than the case with linear multiplicative demand. With mild conditions on the distribution of demand uncertainty, we derive the supplier's optimal buyback contract and show the following results. The supplier strictly prefers buyback contracts to wholesale price-only contracts if and only if the unit production cost is lower than a threshold that depends on the dispersion of demand uncertainty; the optimal buyback rate is decreasing in the unit production cost; the profit allocation within the supply chain and channel efficiency depend on the dispersion of demand uncertainty. These results are in stark contrast to those in the case with linear multiplicative demand. Nevertheless, the relation between the operational decisions under the optimal buyback contract and those under the optimal wholesale price-only contract is consistent with the case of multiplicative demand. We further extend the analysis to two related scenarios. On one hand, our results continue to hold in a supply chain where one supplier sells to two competing retailers. On the other hand, when the retailer does not postpone retail pricing decisions, we establish three distinctive properties of the optimal buyback contract: the supplier strictly prefers buyback contracts to wholesale price-only contracts if and only if the unit production cost is intermediate; the optimal buyback rate is increasing in the unit production cost in the region where the supplier strictly prefers buyback contracts to wholesale price-only contracts; price postponement benefits both the retailer and the supply chain but does not always benefit the supplier. The above analysis shows that the supplier's preference between buyback and wholesale price-only contracts can swing either way when the retailer starts to practice price postponement.

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