Incentivizing distributed energy trading among prosumers: A general Nash bargaining approach

In this paper, we study the energy interaction problem among the autonomous prosumers, and develop an incentive scheme to encourage proactive energy trading. Specifically, without the need for any coordinators, each prosumer makes optimal strategy to share idle resources (renewable energy or loads) and maximizes the social welfare of a multi prosumers system. To incentivize proactive energy trading among prosumers, an incentive scheme is designed to achieve the fair benefits allocation according to their contributions. According to the summation of daily net transaction power, we quantify prosumers' contributions by leveraging the bargai-ning power combined with the rate of return. Based on various bargaining power, a distributed energy trading problem is formulated as a general Nash bargaining problem. We propose a distributed solution method with disclosing limited information to preserve prosumers' privacy. Simulations on different cases are conducted based on the actual data in Shanghai, China. Through a practical case study, the effectiveness of the method is verified in terms of distributed energy trading and fair benefits allocation.

Automated summary

This paper explores the energy interaction problem among autonomous prosumers and proposes an incentive scheme to incentivize proactive energy trading. By quantifying prosumers' contributions and leveraging bargaining power, a distributed energy trading problem is formulated to achieve fair benefits allocation. The method is verified through simulations based on actual data in Shanghai, China, demonstrating effectiveness in distributed energy trading and fair benefits allocation.