Journal
IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON VERY LARGE SCALE INTEGRATION (VLSI) SYSTEMS
Volume 29, Issue 11, Pages 1930-1942Publisher
IEEE-INST ELECTRICAL ELECTRONICS ENGINEERS INC
DOI: 10.1109/TVLSI.2021.3111407
Keywords
Cryptography; Heating systems; Thermal analysis; Correlation; Side-channel attacks; Performance evaluation; Hardware; Power attack; progressive correlation; Rivest-Shamir-Adleman (RSA); side-channel attack (SCA); thermal attack
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This article explores side-channel attacks using heat, introduces correlation thermal attack (CTA) and DL-based thermal attack (DL-based TA), as well as a new attack called progressive CTA (PCTA). The study shows that all three attacks are practical and achieve 100% key recovery, demonstrating the effectiveness of thermal side-channel attacks in retrieving keys from electronic devices.
Side-channel attacks (SCAs) are powerful attacks that could be used to retrieve keys from electronic devices. Several physical leakage sources can be exploited in SCAs, such as power, time, heat, and so on. Heat is one of the side-channels that is not frequently analyzed by attackers in the literature due to the high noise associated with thermal traces. This article investigates the practicality of adapting power-based SCAs [i.e., correlation power analysis (CPA) and deep-learning-based power attacks (DL-based PA)] for thermal attacks and refer to them as correlation thermal attack (CTA) and DL-based thermal attack (DL-based TA). In addition, we introduce a new attack called progressive CTA (PCTA). We evaluate the different thermal SCAs against an unprotected and protected software implementation of Rivest-Shamir-Adleman (RSA). Our results show the practicality of the three attacks (i.e. CTA, DL-based TA, and PCTA) as a 100% key recovery is realized.
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