4.7 Article

Nonatomic aggregative games with infinitely many types

Journal

EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF OPERATIONAL RESEARCH
Volume 301, Issue 3, Pages 1149-1165

Publisher

ELSEVIER
DOI: 10.1016/j.ejor.2021.11.025

Keywords

Game theory; Nonatomic aggregative game; Coupling aggregative constraints; Generalized variational inequality; Monotone game; Variational equilibrium

Funding

  1. PGMO program of Fondation Mathematiques Jacques Hadamard

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This paper defines and analyzes the concept of variational Wardrop equilibrium for nonatomic aggregative games with an infinity of player types. These equilibria are characterized by an infinite-dimensional variational inequality. The paper presents a convergence theorem, under monotonicity conditions, for computing such an equilibrium with arbitrary precision. To achieve this, a sequence of nonatomic games with a finite number of player types is introduced to approximate the initial game. The paper proves the existence of a symmetric Wardrop equilibrium in each of these games, and shows that these symmetric equilibria converge to an equilibrium of the infinite game, which can be computed as solutions of finite dimensional variational inequalities. The model is illustrated through an example from smart grids, where a large population of electricity consumers is described by a parametric distribution, resulting in a nonatomic game with an infinity of different player types, with actions subject to coupling constraints.
We define and analyze the notion of variational Wardrop equilibrium for nonatomic aggregative games with an infinity of player types. These equilibria are characterized through an infinite-dimensional variational inequality. We show, under monotonicity conditions, a convergence theorem which enables to compute such an equilibrium with arbitrary precision. To this end, we introduce a sequence of nonatomic games with a finite number of player types, which approximates the initial game. We show the existence of a symmetric Wardrop equilibrium in each of these games. We prove that those symmetric equilibria converge to an equilibrium of the infinite game, and that they can be computed as solutions of finite dimensional variational inequalities. The model is illustrated through an example from smart grids: the description of a large population of electricity consumers by a parametric distribution gives a nonatomic game with an infinity of different player types, with actions subject to coupling constraints.(c) 2021 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

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