4.8 Article

A new energy storage sharing framework with regard to both storage capacity and power capacity

Journal

APPLIED ENERGY
Volume 307, Issue -, Pages -

Publisher

ELSEVIER SCI LTD
DOI: 10.1016/j.apenergy.2021.118171

Keywords

Community energy storage sharing; Prosumer; Dynamic electricity price mechanism; Non-cooperative game; Distributed optimization; Heavy ball method

Funding

  1. National Natural Science Foundation of China [62173152, 62103156]

Ask authors/readers for more resources

This paper proposes an energy storage sharing framework considering both the storage capacity and the power capacity. By using a non-cooperative game approach, a generalized Nash equilibrium is found as the energy sharing strategy, which improves energy efficiency and reduces costs.
Energy storage systems have received widespread attention due to their advantages on rapid response, smooth fluctuations, and the reduction of temporal and spatial imbalance. At present, most researchers mainly consider the allocation of energy storage capacity while using an average allocation of the power capacity, which may lead to conflicts among users when executing the energy sharing strategies for the case with limited power capacity. In order to better improve energy efficiency and reduce electricity costs, this paper proposes an energy storage sharing framework considering both the storage capacity and the power capacity. Since each prosumer intends to minimize its costs which depend on the behavior of other prosumers, the relationship among prosumers forms a non-cooperative game. By using an algorithm that combines the alternating direction multiplier method and heavy ball method, a generalized Nash equilibrium is found to serve as an energy sharing strategy. Simulation studies and comparisons show that the proposed energy storage sharing framework driven by a dynamic electricity price mechanism can reduce prosumers' net demands, electricity costs and improve the efficiency of energy storage utilization.

Authors

I am an author on this paper
Click your name to claim this paper and add it to your profile.

Reviews

Primary Rating

4.8
Not enough ratings

Secondary Ratings

Novelty
-
Significance
-
Scientific rigor
-
Rate this paper

Recommended

No Data Available
No Data Available