Journal
JOURNAL OF INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS
Volume 18, Issue 2, Pages 219-236Publisher
CAMBRIDGE UNIV PRESS
DOI: 10.1017/S1744137421000448
Keywords
Organizational behavior; property rights; transaction costs
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More than 30 years ago, the author engaged in a debate with Oliver Williams over the theoretical structure of transaction cost economics. This article clarifies the author's criticisms of TCE, discusses empirical evidence, and addresses policy interventions related to labor-managed firms.
More than 30 years ago, I engaged in a debate with Oliver Williamson over the theoretical structure of transaction cost economics (TCE). This debate had its origins in our conflicting views of the labor-managed firm (LMF). Williamson believed that such firms were rare due to their inefficiency while I believed they might be rare due to market failures. Here I clarify my criticisms of TCE and contrast Williamson's view of the LMF with my own approach. I discuss empirical evidence that can distinguish between these two approaches and take up Williamson's challenge to identify policy interventions that could yield net social gains.
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