Improvisation and thinking in movement: an enactivist analysis of agency in artistic practices

In this article, we inquire into Maxine Sheets-Johnstone and Michele Merritt's descriptions and use of dance improvisation as it relates to thinking in movement. We agree with them scholars that improvisational practices present interesting cases for investigating how movement, thinking, and agency intertwine. However, we also find that their descriptions of improvisation overemphasize the dimension of spontaneity as an intuitive letting happen of movements. To recalibrate their descriptions of improvisational practices, we couple Ezequiel Di Paolo, Thomas Buhrmann, and Xabier E. Barandiaran's (2017) enactive account of the constitution of agency with case studies of two expert performers of improvisation: a dancer and a musician. Our analyses hereof show that their improvisations unfold as a sophisticated oscillation of agency between specialized forms of mental and bodily control and, indeed, a more spontaneous letting things happen. In all, this article's conclusions frame thinking in movement concerning improvisational practices as contextually embedded, purposively trained, and inherently relational.

Automated summary

In this article, the authors investigate the relationship between dance improvisation and thinking in movement. They argue that the descriptions of improvisation by some scholars overemphasize spontaneity, and suggest using an enactive account of agency to recalibrate these descriptions. Through case studies of expert performers, they find that improvisations involve a sophisticated oscillation of agency between mental and bodily control, as well as spontaneity. This article concludes that thinking in movement in improvisational practices is contextually embedded, purposively trained, and inherently relational.