Journal
EUROPEAN JOURNAL FOR PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE
Volume 11, Issue 3, Pages -Publisher
SPRINGER
DOI: 10.1007/s13194-021-00365-6
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Funding
- National Institute for Health and Welfare (THL)
- Arts and Humanities Research Council
- British Society for the Philosophy of Science
- Cambridge Commonwealth
- European and International Trust
- Newnham College
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This paper introduces "Representation Minimalism" as a solution to the issues with the Representational Theory of Measurement (RTM), acknowledging its foundational role while addressing its main shortcomings.
The Representational Theory of Measurement (RTM) is the best known account of the kind of representation measurement requires. However, RTM has been challenged from various angles, with critics claiming e.g. that RTM fails to account for actual measurement practice and that it is ambiguous about the nature of measurable attributes. In this paper I use the critical literature on RTM to formulate Representation Minimalism - a characterization of what measurement-relevant representation requires at the minimum. I argue that Representation Minimalism avoids the main problems with RTM while acknowledging its usefulness as the formal foundation of representation in measurement.
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