4.7 Article

Coalition Graph Game-Based P2P Energy Trading With Local Voltage Management

Journal

IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON SMART GRID
Volume 12, Issue 5, Pages 4389-4402

Publisher

IEEE-INST ELECTRICAL ELECTRONICS ENGINEERS INC
DOI: 10.1109/TSG.2021.3070160

Keywords

Games; Peer-to-peer computing; Physical layer; Batteries; Distribution networks; Jacobian matrices; Simulation; Peer-to-peer energy trading; local power export; voltage rise issue; coalition graph game; Myerson value rule; electricity bill reduction

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This paper explores the feasibility of peer-to-peer energy trading in a voltage-constrained grid-connected network, proposing a local voltage management scheme to guide frequent energy trading among prosumers and developing a coalition graph game-based P2P energy trading framework. Simulation results demonstrate that the proposed framework can help prosumers export power in the network and reduce overall electricity costs.
In this paper, the feasibility of peer-to-peer (P2P) energy trading in a voltage-constrained grid-connected network is studied. In particular, a local voltage management scheme is proposed that takes network constraints into consideration to instruct the prosumers to trade energy frequently in the P2P market. A coalition graph game-based P2P energy trading framework is developed, in which prosumers can form the coalition to negotiate and decide on the energy trading parameters, such as trading quantities and prices. The Myerson value rule is used to allocate the total payoff of the proposed game fairly among the participating prosumers. Further, the stability of the proposed coalition structure is confirmed. Several simulation results are provided to verify the effectiveness of the developed P2P trading model. The simulation results show that the proposed P2P trading framework can enable prosumers to export power without causing high voltage problem in the network, and help prosumers cut down a significant portion of their overall electricity costs compared to the feed-in-tariff and coalition game model without mutual negotiations.

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