Journal
RESOURCES CONSERVATION AND RECYCLING
Volume 171, Issue -, Pages -Publisher
ELSEVIER
DOI: 10.1016/j.resconrec.2021.105629
Keywords
Low-carbon transformation; Green supply chain; CO2 pooling arrangement; Environmental performance; Game theory
Categories
Funding
- NSFC Excellent Young Scientists Fund [71822202]
- Guangdong Basic and Applied Basic Research Foundation [2021A1515011980]
- Fundamental Research Funds for the Central Universities
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The EU's 2019 low-carbon emission standard has driven gasoline car brands to either pay penalties or cooperate with E-vehicle brands like Tesla to pool their carbon emissions. However, a sufficiently high excess emission premium can successfully induce gasoline car brands to choose the cooperation strategy for low-carbon transformation.
Driven by the EU 2019 low-carbon emission standard for automobile industry, gasoline car brands such as Fiat have considered either to (1) pay penalty or (2) cooperate with E-vehicle brands such as Tesla to pool their carbon emissions. These two strategies result in corresponding supply chain structures where the latter has cooperation relationship between automobile brands because the gasoline car brand has to purchase and resell E-vehicles. In this paper, we study under what conditions the gasoline car brand will choose the Pooling Strategy, which promotes low-carbon transformation. We show that the gasoline car brand's profit will always be hurt by the EU 2019 Standard, but a sufficiently high excess emission premium can successfully induce the gasoline car brand to choose the Pooling Strategy. We then develop a lifetime environmental performance index and find that, interestingly, a tighter carbon emissions standard may result in worse environmental performance.
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