Optimal defense-attack strategies between M defenders and N attackers: A method based on cumulative prospect theory

This research studies the system defense of M defenders against N attackers. We model this problem as a defense-attack game between M defenders and N attackers based on the cumulative prospect theory. In this game, the defenders can allocate their resources to defend the system from being attacked, and to attack the attackers such that the opponents lose their offensive power. In response, the attackers can allocate its offensive resources to attack the system and defend themselves from being attacked by the defenders. In this research, we use the cumulative prospect value instead of the vulnerability as the performance measure such that the risk attitudes of defenders and attackers can be considered. Further, we study the cooperative behaviors and non-cooperative behaviors of the attackers and analyze the effect on the optimal resource allocation. Numerical experiments are carried out to illustrate the applications.

Automated summary

This research investigates the system defense of M defenders against N attackers, modeling the problem as a defense-attack game based on cumulative prospect theory. Risk attitudes of defenders and attackers are considered, with analysis of cooperative and non-cooperative behaviors impacting optimal resource allocation. Numerical experiments are conducted for illustration.