Imitation and aspiration dynamics bring different evolutionary outcomes in feedback-evolving games

Feedback-evolving games characterize the interplay between the evolution of strategies and environments. Rich dynamics have been derived for such games under the premise of the replicator equation, which unveils persistent oscillations between cooperation and defection. Besides replicator dynamics, here we have employed aspiration dynamics, in which individuals, instead of comparing payoffs with opposite strategies, assess their payoffs by self-evaluation to update strategies. We start with a brief review of feedback-evolving games with replicator dynamics and then comprehensively discuss such games with aspiration dynamics. Interestingly, the tenacious cycles, as perceived in replicator dynamics, cannot be observed in aspiration dynamics. Our analysis reveals that a parameter -which depicts the strength of cooperation in enhancing the environment-plays a pivotal role in comprehending the dynamics. In particular, with the symmetric aspiration level, if replete and depleted states, respectively, experience Prisoner's Dilemma and Trivial games, the rich environment is achievable only when > 1. The case < 1 never allows us to reach the replete state, even with a higher cooperation level. Furthermore, if cooperators aspire less than defectors, then the enhanced state can be achieved with a relatively lower value compared with the opposite scenario because too much expectation from cooperation can be less beneficial.

Automated summary

The interplay between strategy evolution and environment in feedback-evolving games has been studied using replicator dynamics and aspiration dynamics. Results show that persistent cycles observed in replicator dynamics are not present in aspiration dynamics. The strength parameter depicting the effects of cooperation in enhancing the environment plays a pivotal role in comprehending the dynamics. By controlling the parameter value, a rich environment can be achieved.