A bilevel optimization approach to decide the feasibility of bookings in the European gas market

The European gas market is organized as a so-called entry-exit system with the main goal to decouple transport and trading. To this end, gas traders and the transmission system operator (TSO) sign so-called booking contracts that grant capacity rights to traders to inject or withdraw gas at certain nodes up to this capacity. On a day-ahead basis, traders then nominate the actual amount of gas within the previously booked capacities. By signing a booking contract, the TSO guarantees that all nominations within the booking bounds can be transported through the network. This results in a highly challenging mathematical problem. Using potential-based flows to model stationary gas physics, feasible bookings on passive networks, i.e., networks without controllable elements, have been characterized in the recent literature. In this paper, we consider networks with linearly modeled active elements such as compressors or control valves. Since these active elements allow the TSO to control the gas flow, the single-level approaches for passive networks from the literature are no longer applicable. We thus present a bilevel model to decide the feasibility of bookings in networks with active elements. While this model is well-defined for general active networks, we focus on the class of networks for which active elements do not lie on cycles. This assumption allows us to reformulate the original bilevel model such that the lower-level problem is linear for every given upper-level decision. Consequently, we derive several single-level reformulations for this case. Besides the classic Karush-Kuhn-Tucker reformulation, we obtain three problem-specific optimal-value-function reformulations. The latter also lead to novel characterizations of feasible bookings in networks with active elements that do not lie on cycles. We compare the performance of our methods by a case study based on data from the GasLib.

Automated summary

The European gas market is organized with an entry-exit system to separate transport and trading. Traders sign booking contracts with TSO to determine capacity rights, and networks with active elements require a bilevel model to determine feasibility. We present single-level reformulations for networks under specific conditions.