Simple Contracts to Coordinate the Capacity Procurement Model with Asymmetric Demand Information

This paper studies the important problem of how to coordinate the capacity procurement model with asymmetric demand information. Under the model, the supplier has to secure necessary capacity before receiving a firm order from the manufacturer who possesses private demand information for her product. Optimal supply chain performance requires the manufacturer to share her forecast truthfully and the supplier to build enough capacity. In the literature, some elaborate contracts are designed to solve the problem. However, the authors prove that two simple conventional contracts (linear capacity reservation contract and payback agreement) can coordinate the supply chain and guarantee credible information sharing. Besides, the authors propose a new mechanism in which punishment is imposed in the payment function to bind the parties. To avoid punishment, the firms will choose the best decision for the entire supply chain. The contracts in this paper are all simple and easy to implement. The authors believe this work provides some insights to design coordination contracts in theory or in practice.

Automated summary

This paper studies how to coordinate the capacity procurement model with asymmetric demand information. The authors prove that simple traditional contracts can achieve coordination in the supply chain and ensure truthful information sharing. The work provides insights for designing coordination contracts in theory or in practice.