Game strategies in government-led eco-compensation in the Xin'an River Basin from the perspective of the politics of scale

China's policy on ecological compensation (eco-compensation) in watershed ecosystems is of economic, social and environmental significance for China's ecological governance and protection of natural areas. It involves balancing the interests of regional stakeholders, coordinating the development of regional environments and establishing effective cooperation models, making it a classic topic for geographical research. This study introduces the concept of institutional stickiness to the theory of politics of scale to analyze the features and mechanisms of the game behavior of government entities in the process of implementing watershed eco-compensation in the Xin'an River Basin. Our results show the following: government entities at various levels, including the central, provincial and municipal governments, experienced the three stages of game strategy of competition, cooperation and coopetition; building a government community of shared interests can promote watershed eco-compensation, and appropriate intervention by the central government is key to achieving inter-provincial watershed eco-compensation; there was clear institutional stickiness during the transition from a vertical model of watershed eco-compensation to a vertical-horizontal model, with government entities using policy innovations and social participation to limit and reduce stickiness so as to reshape the watershed eco-compensation system; scalar jumping is the core mechanism that promoted eco-compensation in the study basin, and government entities shaped the discourse on watershed eco-compensation by redistributing powers and capital and creating informal constraints, which promoted the transformation of eco-compensation from a strong state-weak society structural model, to a strong state-strong society model in the Xin'an River Basin. These results can provide theoretical support for the construction of inter-regional watershed eco-compensation mechanisms, provide a scientific basis for the rational evaluation and guidance of watershed eco-compensation practices, and promote the coordinated and sustainable socioeconomic development of watersheds.

Automated summary

China's policy on ecological compensation in watershed ecosystems plays a crucial role in ecological governance and natural protection. Government entities at various levels have experienced competition, cooperation, and coopetition in implementing eco-compensation, with scalar jumping being the core mechanism for promoting eco-compensation. These findings provide theoretical support for constructing inter-regional watershed eco-compensation mechanisms and can guide eco-compensation practices for sustainable socioeconomic development.