Evolutionary multiplayer game analysis of accounts receivable financing based on supply chain financing

This paper introduces the core enterprise into the traditional accounts receivable financing model, which only includes the bank and the small and medium-sized enterprise (SME), and further analyses the strategic decisions of the bank, the SME, and the core enterprise by applying game theory. The stability of strategic decisions is also analysed. Finally, we prove the usability of the pledged financing mode of accounts receivable based on supply chain finance through simulation analysis and evolutionary game theory. Research results show that adding the core enterprise to the traditional accounts receivable financing model can reduce the bank's loan risk to a certain extent, enhance the credibility of the accounts receivable, which will be beneficial to the realisation of accounts receivable financing. The successful operation of accounts receivable financing mode will help the three parties to achieve three-win results. In addition, the lending rate of the bank and the reputation loss suffered by the core enterprise due to default will affect the evolutionary equilibrium of the tripartite evolutionary game.

Automated summary

This paper investigates the impact of integrating the core enterprise into the traditional accounts receivable financing model, and analyzes the strategic decisions and stability of the bank, SME, and core enterprise using game theory and evolutionary game theory. Results show that the pledged financing mode of accounts receivable can reduce bank risk, enhance credibility, and achieve a win-win outcome for all parties involved. Additionally, factors such as bank lending rate and reputation loss for the core enterprise due to default will affect the equilibrium of the tripartite evolutionary game.