N-1 Reliability Makes It Difficult for False Data Injection Attacks to Cause Physical Consequences

This paper demonstrates that false data injection (FDI) attacks are extremely limited in their ability to cause physical consequences on N - 1 reliable power systems operating with real-time contingency analysis (RTCA) and security constrained economic dispatch (SCED). Prior work has shown that FDI attacks can be designed via an attacker-defender bi-level linear program (ADBLP) to cause physical overflows after re-dispatch using DCOPF. In this paper, it is shown that attacks designed using DCOPF fail to cause overflows on N - 1 reliable systems because the system response modeled is inaccurate. An ADBLP that accurately models the system response is proposed to find the worst-case physical consequences, thereby modeling a strong attacker with system level knowledge. Simulation results on the synthetic Texas system with 2000 buses show that even with the new enhanced attacks, for systems operated conservatively due to N - 1 constraints, the designed attacks only lead to post-contingency overflows. Moreover, the attacker must control a large portion of measurements and physically create a contingency in the system to cause consequences. Therefore, it is conceivable but requires an extremely sophisticated attacker to cause physical consequences on N - 1 reliable power systems operated with RTCA and SCED.

Automated summary

This paper demonstrates that false data injection (FDI) attacks are extremely limited in their ability to cause physical consequences on N - 1 reliable power systems operating with real-time contingency analysis (RTCA) and security constrained economic dispatch (SCED). Attacks designed using DCOPF fail to cause overflows on N - 1 reliable systems because the system response modeled is inaccurate. Therefore, it requires an extremely sophisticated attacker to cause physical consequences on N - 1 reliable power systems operated with RTCA and SCED.