4.6 Article

Stability of faces in asymmetric evolutionary games

Journal

ANNALS OF OPERATIONS RESEARCH
Volume 304, Issue 1-2, Pages 343-359

Publisher

SPRINGER
DOI: 10.1007/s10479-021-04157-2

Keywords

Asymmetric evolutionary games; Replicator dynamics; Games with infinite strategy space; Strong immovable and immutable faces; Lyapunov stability; Weak attracting

Funding

  1. SERB, Department of Science and Technology [MTR/2017/000674]

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This paper focuses on studying the concept of individual states in asymmetric evolutionary games with infinite strategy space, and introduces the concepts of strong immovable and immutable states, followed by discussing the stability results of these states.
The concept of a face of population states arises naturally in evolutionary games. This paper studies faces of profiles in asymmetric evolutionary games with infinite strategy space. The concepts of strong immovable and immutable faces of profiles are introduced and stability results for these faces are discussed.

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