Secure quantum key distribution with a subset of malicious devices

The malicious manipulation of quantum key distribution (QKD) hardware is a serious threat to its security, as, typically, neither end users nor QKD manufacturers can validate the integrity of every component of their QKD system in practice. One possible approach to re-establish the security of QKD is to use a redundant number of devices. Following this idea, we address various corruption models of the possibly malicious devices and show that, compared to the most conservative model of active and collaborative corrupted devices, natural assumptions allow to significantly enhance the secret key rate or considerably reduce the necessary resources. Furthermore, we show that, for most practical situations, the resulting finite-size secret key rate is similar to that of the standard scenario assuming trusted devices.

Automated summary

The malicious manipulation of quantum key distribution (QKD) hardware poses a serious threat to security. Using a redundant number of devices can enhance key rate and reduce necessary resources. In practical situations, the finite-size secret key rate is similar to the standard scenario assuming trusted devices.