4.6 Article

Intellectual Property Management in Publicly Funded R&D Program and Projects: Optimizing Principal-Agent Relationship through Transdisciplinary Approach

Journal

SUSTAINABILITY
Volume 12, Issue 23, Pages -

Publisher

MDPI
DOI: 10.3390/su12239923

Keywords

intellectual property; startup; knowledge logistics information asymmetry; adverse selection; moral hazard; mixed methods

Funding

  1. Center of Innovation Program from Japan Science and Technology Agency (JST) [JPMJCE1305]
  2. MEXT KAKENHI [20H01546]
  3. Grants-in-Aid for Scientific Research [20H01546] Funding Source: KAKEN

Ask authors/readers for more resources

Large-scale, publicly funded research and development (R&D) programs are implemented to accelerate state-of-the-art science, technology, and innovation applications that are expected to solve various societal problems. The present study aims to build on the body of theory on the mechanisms that promote or impede the creation of intellectual property in such programs. Using a mixed methods approach and combining quantitative network analysis and qualitative semistructured interviews, we conducted a case study to investigate best practices in terms of intellectual property creation in a Japanese governmental research and development program. The results of the network analysis showed that the core/periphery structure in the co-inventor network of patents and joint application by a university and a startup promoted intellectual property creation. The results of the interview confirmed the significance of a reciprocal mindset, which the researchers in academia could acquire through collaboration with a startup. These results suggest that a knowledge logistics system for agile intellectual property management can be established by learning to acquire tacit knowledge on social implementation. Furthermore, we focus on the principal-agent relationship between knowledge producers and knowledge consumers as a factor that impedes the creation of intellectual property. We also discuss adverse selection and moral hazards caused by information asymmetry between knowledge producers and knowledge consumers and how to deal with them.

Authors

I am an author on this paper
Click your name to claim this paper and add it to your profile.

Reviews

Primary Rating

4.6
Not enough ratings

Secondary Ratings

Novelty
-
Significance
-
Scientific rigor
-
Rate this paper

Recommended

No Data Available
No Data Available