Should We Treat Teddy Bear 2.0 as a Kantian Dog? Four Arguments for the Indirect Moral Standing of Personal Social Robots, with Implications for Thinking About Animals and Humans

The use of autonomous and intelligent personal social robots raises questions concerning their moral standing. Moving away from the discussion about direct moral standing and exploring the normative implications of a relational approach to moral standing, this paper offers four arguments that justify giving indirect moral standing to robots under specific conditions based on some of the ways humans-as social, feeling, playing, and doubting beings-relate to them. The analogy of the Kantian dog is used to assist reasoning about this. The paper also discusses the implications of this approach for thinking about the moral standing of animals and humans, showing why, when, and how an indirect approach can also be helpful in these fields, and using Levinas and Dewey as sources of inspiration to discuss some challenges raised by this approach.

Automated summary

This paper discusses the moral standing of autonomous and intelligent personal social robots, proposing four arguments for giving indirect moral standing to robots under specific conditions and using the analogy of the Kantian dog for reasoning. It also explores the implications of this approach for the moral standing of animals and humans, drawing inspiration from Levinas and Dewey to discuss the challenges raised by this approach.