Journal
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ELECTRICAL POWER & ENERGY SYSTEMS
Volume 123, Issue -, Pages -Publisher
ELSEVIER SCI LTD
DOI: 10.1016/j.ijepes.2020.106225
Keywords
Coordinated cyber physical attacks; Remedial action schemes; Cascading failures; Controlled islanding
Categories
Funding
- National Science Foundation (NSF) [1600058]
- Direct For Computer & Info Scie & Enginr
- Division Of Computer and Network Systems [1600058] Funding Source: National Science Foundation
Ask authors/readers for more resources
Deployment of energy management systems in electric utilities has resulted in improvement of situational awareness in power systems. However, additional cyber security issues are introduced in real-time operations. Substantial research has since been dedicated towards the feasibility and formulation of coordinated cyber-physical attacks against power systems. However, the full extent of their impacts contributing to cascading failures is not widely explored. This paper investigates to what extent such coordinated attacks against power system state estimation lead to large scale blackouts. To consider the worst case scenarios, false data injection attacks against parameter-based remedial action schemes are investigated on realistic power networks under large inter-area power transfers. Additionally, three indices are proposed to quantify the severity of the postattack impacts: Loss of Observability after Cascading Failures, Loss of Observability after Controlled Islanding and Lines Recoverable after Controlled Islanding. The three indices will enable system operators to estimate the extent of recoverability of the grid after attacks have adversely impacted the power grid. All simulations are carried on synthetic Illinois 200-bus and South Carolina 500-bus systems.
Authors
I am an author on this paper
Click your name to claim this paper and add it to your profile.
Reviews
Recommended
No Data Available