Secure Directional Modulation With Few-Bit Phase Shifters: Optimal and Iterative-Closed-Form Designs

In this paper, directional modulation (DM) is investigated to enhance physical layer security. Practical transmitter designs are exploited under imperfect channel state information (CSI) and hardware constraints, such as finite-resolution phase shifters (PSs) and per-antenna power budget. Tailored for the practical issues in realizing DM, a series of practical scenarios are investigated. Starting from the scenario where eavesdroppers (Eve)s' information is completely unknown, corresponding designs are proposed to optimize legitimate users (LU)s' receiving performance while randomizing the Eves' received signal. When the Eves' CSI is imperfectly known, in the second scenario, the Eves' receiving performance is further deteriorated by imposing destructive interference to the Eves. For each scenario, three algorithms are proposed under hardware constraints and imperfect CSI, i.e., one direct-mapping algorithm suitable for high/moderate number of bits in PSs, one heuristic algorithm with improved receiving performance at the cost of complexity, and one iterative-closed-form algorithm with enhanced practicality of symbol-level based DM. Simulation demonstrates that the algorithms achieve lower symbol error rate (SER) at the LUs while significantly deteriorating the Eves' SER, leading to an improved secrecy throughput over the benchmarks.

Automated summary

The paper investigates directional modulation (DM) to enhance physical layer security under practical hardware constraints, achieving lower symbol error rate (SER) at legitimate users while significantly deteriorating the Eves' SER. The proposed algorithms optimize receiver performance for legitimate users while randomizing signals for eavesdroppers under imperfect channel state information (CSI) and hardware constraints.