Journal
ACTA ASTRONAUTICA
Volume 177, Issue -, Pages 313-319Publisher
PERGAMON-ELSEVIER SCIENCE LTD
DOI: 10.1016/j.actaastro.2020.07.036
Keywords
Space debris; Satellites; Space agents; Tragedy of the commons; Collision; Tax system; Game theory
Categories
Funding
- research program In-depth UDL 2018
- Universite of Franche-Comte
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Satellites launched by independent spacefaring agencies and firms create space congestion and collision risk. Taking as benchmark the cost of a marginal reduction of the congestion rate, we discuss tax mechanisms financing a debris removal effort. We compare the non-cooperative equilibrium traffic when there is a tax on each new launch to recover cleanup costs, with the welfare optimal traffic under a centralized tax. We find that under the latter it is twice as easy to recover cleanup costs and increase traffic than under the former. We also show that a linear tax is twice as effective as a quadratic one.
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