4.7 Article

Evolutionary game and numerical simulation of participants' collaborative behavior in integrated project delivery project

Journal

ALEXANDRIA ENGINEERING JOURNAL
Volume 60, Issue 1, Pages 373-385

Publisher

ELSEVIER
DOI: 10.1016/j.aej.2020.08.038

Keywords

Collaborative behavior; Evolutionary game; Numerical simulation; IPD project

Funding

  1. Shandong Provincial Natural Science Foundation China [ZR2017MEE043]
  2. Project of Shandong Provincial Social Science Planning [18CGLJ24]
  3. Shandong Province Graduate Education Innovation Project [SDYY15086, SDYY15088]
  4. National Natural Science Foundation of China [51874189]

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This study introduces various variable parameters into a tripartite evolutionary game model based on evolutionary game theory, analyzing behavioral strategies and discussing the stability of system equilibrium. The research also examines the impact of these parameters on the evolutionary games, and presents a dynamic mechanism for collaborative behavior under limited rationality. The study concludes that the key to driving participants towards collaborative behavior lies in the owner's supervision.
BIM cost, owner's punishment intensity, liquidated damage, size and allocation ratio of incentive pool, Integrated Project Delivery (IPD) gain, loss caused by BIM data resource sharing and other variable parameters are introduced into tripartite evolutionary game model which is established based on evolutionary game theory. Tripartite behavioral strategies are analyzed by evolutionary game theory. The stability of system equilibrium and influence of variable parameters on the stability of evolutionary games are discussed. The tripartite dynamic evolutionary game law based on collaborative behavior under the premise of limited rationality is studied. Then, the tripartite game pathways are numerically simulated by using MATLAB software. The influence of initial intention and variable parameters on the process and results of system evolution are analyzed. The dynamic mechanism of owner's supervision on contractor's and designer's collaborative behavior strategies is clarified. It shows that key point of driving participants to choose collaborative behavior is on owner side. (C) 2020 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. on behalf of Faculty of Engineering, Alexandria University.

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