Journal
IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON CONTROL OF NETWORK SYSTEMS
Volume 7, Issue 3, Pages 1140-1150Publisher
IEEE-INST ELECTRICAL ELECTRONICS ENGINEERS INC
DOI: 10.1109/TCNS.2020.2964142
Keywords
Resource management; Cost accounting; Radio access technologies; Control systems; Bandwidth; Pricing; Channel allocation; Constrained networks; incentive compatibility; mechanism; resource allocation
Funding
- SRIBD Startup Fund [JCYJSP2019090001]
- National Spectrum Consortium project [NSC-16-0140]
- NSF [CMMI-1829552]
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We consider the problem of designing an online mechanism for trading divisible resources over a constrained network. In an online setting, participating agents learn about their marginal valuations gradually over time. We propose a mechanism that implements the efficient allocation of resources with a finite-time guarantee, i.e., upon stopping after T > 0 rounds, the incentive to misreport information has a uniform bound that is O(1/root T). We illustrate the application of the proposed mechanism to optimize the efficiency in MHA networks, an emerging type of heterogeneous networks where users can simultaneously connect to several access technologies.
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