Resilient Control Design Based on a Sampled-Data Model for a Class of Networked Control Systems Under Denial-of-Service Attacks

This article is concerned with designing resilient state feedback controllers for a class of networked control systems under denial-of-service (DoS) attacks. The sensor samples system states periodically. The DoS attacks usually prevent those sampled signals from being transmitted through a communication network. A logic processor embedded in the controller is introduced to not only receive sampled signals but also capture information on the duration time of each DoS attack. Note that the duration time of DoS attacks is usually both lower and upper bounded. Then the closed-loop system is modeled as an aperiodic sampled-data system closely related to both lower and upper bounds of duration time of DoS attacks. By introducing a novel looped functional, which caters for the N-order canonical Bessel-Legendre inequalities, some N-dependent stability criteria are presented for the resultant closed-loop system. It is worth pointing out that a number of identity formulas are uncovered, which enable us to apply the notable free-weighting matrix approach to derive less conservative stability criteria. A linear-matrix-inequality-based criterion is provided to design stabilizing state-feedback controllers against DoS attacks. A satellite control system is given to demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed method.