Journal
SYNTHESE
Volume 198, Issue 11, Pages 11125-11157Publisher
SPRINGER
DOI: 10.1007/s11229-020-02775-0
Keywords
Conceptual analysis; Concepts; Intuition; Metaphilosophy; Methodology; Philosophical phenomena
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Conceptual analysis is often misunderstood as targeting concepts directly, when in fact it is a method for analyzing philosophical phenomena. By recognizing this distinction, skepticism about the viability of conceptual analysis can be addressed.
Conceptual analysis is a misnomer-it refers, but it does not refer to a method or practice that involves the analysis of concepts. Once this is recognized, many of the main arguments for skepticism about conceptual analysis can be answered, since many of these arguments falsely assume that conceptual analyses target concepts. The present paper defends conceptual analysis from skepticism about its viability and, positively, presents an argument for viewing conceptual analyses as targeting philosophical phenomena, not our concepts of these phenomena.
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